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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-LINKING "EMPLOYER 
FREE SPEECH" TO No-SotICITATION RuLE-During an organizational cam-
paign the employer prohibited any dissemination of literature on company 
property and soliciting or campaigning on company time by employees 
while itself distributing within the plant non-threatening, anti-union 
literature. General Counsel for the NLRB contended that by this conduct 
the employer "interfered with, restrained or coerced" employees in their 
exercise of the right to self-organization.1 This contention was rejected 
by the NLRB,2 but on appeal was accepted by the Court of Appeals for· 
the District of Columbia.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
1 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§158(a)(l);-
157. 
2 Nutone, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955). 
3 United Steelworkers of America, CIO v. NLRB, Nutone, Inc., Intervenor, (D.C. 
Cir. 1956) 243 F. (2d) 593. 
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held, reversed, two justices dissenting. Even if an employer could commit an 
unfair labor practice by enforcing an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule 
while itself engaging in solicitation activities that would violate the rule 
if engaged. in. by employees, there is no basis in the record for such a 
finding here. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 357 U.S. 
357 (1958). 
The Supreme Court had not previously faced the question whether 
employer distribution coupled with enforcement of a no-solicitation rule, 
each activity being valid if examined individually, could constitute un-
lawful activity. In two recent cases, however, circuit courts had ruled 
on a similar combination of enforcement of a valid no-solicitation rule, 
d~livery of a non-threatening, anti-union speech, and denial of union 
requests for equal opportunity to address employees. The Second Circuit 
in Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB4 held that such conduct was an unfair 
labor practice; the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co.5 held 
that it, was not. The basic cause of this divergence was disagreement on 
the applicability of section S(c),6 the "employer free speech" provision 
of t4!'!: .amended National Labor Relations Act. Although courts had 
recogIJ.ized non-coercive partisan expression by employers as lawful before 
enactment of this section,7 they had been quick to find statements of opinion 
coercive, originally by considering coercion as inherent in an employer's 
economic powe~ and -later by relating such statements to a coercive 
course of conduct.9 Moreover, speech was found unlawful because delivered 
on company property during working hours to a "captive audience."10 
Section S(c) was designed, in part, to prevent the Board from holding 
speech unlawful under the "captive audience" theory11 and from connecting 
it with unrelated unfair labor practices.12 However, the section left un-
4 (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. ll45 U.S. 905 (1953). 
5 (6th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 78. 
6 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(c). This 
section -provides that expression or dissemination of any views "shall not constitute or 
-be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if [it] contains no threat of reprisal or force 
or promise of benefit." 
7 NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), re-hearing, 319 U.S. 
533 (1943): NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, (8th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 556; NLRB v. 
American Tube Bending Co., (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 993, cert. den. 320 U.S. 768 (1943). 
8 E.g., NLRB v. Federbush Co., (2d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 954. 
· 9 E.g., NLRB v. Virginia ·Electric & Power Co., note 7 supra. 
10 E.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 NL.R.B. 802 (1946). Affirmed on narrower grounds in 
NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 373. 
11 For particular reaction to the Clark Bros. decision, note 10 supra, see H. Rep. 245, 
80th Cong.,_ ls~. sess., p. 33 (1947). See, generally, S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 
23-24 (1947); H. Conf. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 45 (1947); 93 CoNG. REc. 6443-
6447, 6859-6860 (1947). 
12See Monumental Life Insurance, 69 NL.R.B. 247 (1946). See also the pre-enactment 
material, note 11 supra. . 
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certain13 whether the unlawfulness of expression was to be determined 
solely by language used or also by examination of the circumstances.14 
Thus, as might be expected, varying interpretations of section S(c) were 
employed in the principal and analogous cases. Under the Bonwit Teller15 
view enforcement of a no-solicitation rule is unfair or "discriminatory" 
if the employer uses the plant forum and denies union requests for the 
same opportunity. The court there found that section S(c) was inappli-
cable since the question raised was the employer's right to use unfair 
campaign methods, not its right to deliver an anti-union speech. It 
also stated that the denial of "equal opportunity" for union speech 
at the plant necessarily established serious interference with organizational 
activity since exclusive use of the plant forum implied a tremendous 
practical advantage that could not be counteracted by alternative means 
of communication. On the other hand, the W oolworth16 view denies that 
the employer must allow the union "equal opportunity." The court there 
believed that so to link speech and action would place on the employer's 
right to speak a limitation not found in section S(c) and that only limita-
tions expressed in that section could be recognized. Further, it felt that 
the employer's refusal to share its plant forum could not be "interference" 
unless the union showed the inadequacy of alternative communication 
facilities. The Supreme Court has taken a middle-ground position. First, 
it has accepted the Bonwit Teller theory that employer expression closely 
related to action within a course of conduct is not protected by section S(c). 
Such an interpretation appears more reasonable than an absolute-right 
view of the section, especially since employees will be influenced by the 
joint impact of such employer conduct. Second, the Court follows the 
Woolworth view that employer speech plus enforcement of a no-solicitation 
rule, when combined, are not necessarily unlawful. Activity is "unfair" 
under the act only when it interferes with the exercise of organizational 
rights. The Court takes the logical position that interference cannot 
invariably be presumed but should be based on a Board evaluation of 
13 For discussion of the general success of §8(c) in clarifying the extent of protection 
accorded employer speech, see note, 43 GEo. L. J. 405 (1955); Kovar, "Reappraisal of 
Employer Free Speech," 3 DEPAUL L. •REv. 184 (1954); note, 38 VA. L. REv. 1037 (1952). 
14 The enacted version of §8(c) omitted both the House qualification on "contains" 
of "by its terms" and the Senate specification of "under all the circumstances." For use 
of the House version see NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra; for approval of 
the Senate approach see NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 178 F. (2d) 822. 
15 Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, note 4 supra. Accord, NLRB v. American Tube 
Bending Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 45. See also dissenting opinions in NLRB v. 
F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra, and Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). 
For discussion of the importance of the plant forum, see Livingston dissent and note, 61 
YALE L. J. 1066 (1952). 
16 NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 5 supra. Accord, Livingston Shirt Corp., note 
15 supra (no-solicitation rule confined to working hours). See also dissenting opinion in 
Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, note 4 supra. 
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industrial actualities. Although presumptions of a refusal of equal oppor-
tunity and of the inadequacy of alternative communication channels may 
be justified, especially where the more extensive impact of a no-solicitation 
(as contrasted with a no-distribution) rule is involved, again it appears 
more practical for the Board rather than the judiciary to apply these 
presumptions. Thus, the Court in the principal case has clarified the 
function of section 8(c). It has indicated that the section does not provide 
absolute protection for employer speech but instead allows expression 
linked with closely related action to constitute an unfair labor practice 
if, under the circumstances, an actual interference with opportunities for 
organizational communication can be clearly demonstrated. 
Barbara Burger 
